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ow does one conceptualise 'nothing'?  What is 'nothing'?  What do we 
mean when we speak of the 'nothing'?  Is 'nothing' really anything at all?  
If 'nothing' haunts, disrupts and deconstructs us, does this imply that it 
is 'something' or is it, after all, nothing and is it this very nothingness that bothers 
us?  Do we really mean anything when we speak of 'nothing'?  Is anything 
conveyed or do we merely engage in idle chatter or, indeed, in nothing at all? 
 
At one time, such questions would have been dismissed (and still may be by 
some) as frivolous ephemera, mere sophistry, questions that are really non-
questions or just games played with words.  But for those philosophers writing 
in the wake of Nietzsche, questions of the 'nothing' have become urgent, 
obsessive even.  Nietzsche's evocation of the 'nihil' has haunted philosophers - 
and, increasingly, theologians - down to the present day.  Far from being 
peripheral, the 'nihil' has become central, defining our contemporary thought 
and, even, our cultural condition.  To appreciate why this is the case, we need to 
understand how, for Nietzsche, the 'nihil' is inextricably linked with God.  The 
'nothing' does not appear from 'nowhere' but is, in effect, the trace of the death of 
God.  When God departs, the 'nihil' spontaneously emerges, even if, like God, it 
emerges without ever 'appearing'.   
 
Our most contemporary obsessions are, however, rarely new.  Far from being a 
distinctively postmodern preoccupation, it is clear that questions of the 'nihil' 
likewise haunted the pre-modern mind.  The episteme of the latter was, of 
course, theological rather than nihilistic, but pre-modern theologians were more 
mindful of the nihil than their modern successors who, on the whole (and in the 
interests of the whole), tended to repress it.  Augustine, in particular, spent a 
great deal of his intellectual life wrestling with the idea of the 'nihil' and probing 
its multitudinous ramifications.   
 
Augustine and Nietzsche are unlikely bedfellows; indeed, for many they are 
polar opposites.  But for all their differences, they were agreed on the inextricable 
connection between God and the 'nihil', a connection that pulled them apart as 
much as it brought them together.  Although Augustine could not, of course, 
even have contemplated the notion of the death of God, he nevertheless 
concurred with Nietzsche in his conviction that without God, the 'nihil' would 
spontaneously (re-) emerge.  If God were to cease his continuous activity of 
conservation, the world would lapse into nothingness.  Whether Augustine was 
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anticipating Nietzsche or Nietzsche was echoing Augustine, it is clear that for 
both, God is that which alone guards against the advent of nihilism.  It may 
further be said that Heidegger was only too aware of this unstated complicity, 
arguing that Nietzsche's nihilism brought to a close the circular movement of 
Western metaphysics that began with theology.  For Heidegger, the task of 
thinking was to disclose new possibilities beyond that of theology on the one 
hand and nihilism on the other, which are complicit in their  belonging to the 
movment of ontotheology.1 
 
Unexpectedly in one case and more predictably in the other, both Augustine and 
Nietzsche have become postmodern icons.  For postmodern and continental 
philosophers of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, the haunting 
presence of Nietzsche is unmistakable.  Meanwhile, for those who interpret 
postmodernism as a prelude to the recovery of a theological neo-orthodoxy, 
Augustine has emerged as their patron saint.  Put bluntly, the nihilists have 
Nietzsche while the theologians have Augustine.  But can we not imagine 
permeation and crosscurrents within and between these so-called opposites?  
Indeed, just as postmodern theologians have been learning some of Nietzsche's 
lessons, perhaps also postmodern nihilists may learn something from Augustine.  
Even more daringly, perhaps, transgressive readings of both thinkers may help 
to dislodge the very opposition between nihilists and theologians.  In this article, 
I attempt to contribute to that task by re-considering what Augustine has to say 
about the 'nihil' and, in particular, the latter's relation to God.  As such, this will 
not be a simple exposition of Augustine's view of the 'nihil'.  Rather, it will be an 
experimental and transgressive endeavour in which I read Augustine's texts 
'against the grain', finding in them a number of things that would no doubt 
surprise him.  For all his insistence on the unfettered priority of God, I suggest 
that one can discern in his texts a much more postmodern and differential 
relationship between God and the 'nihil'.  In other words, we shall be led to ask: 
is the 'nihil' possible without God and is God possible without the 'nihil'? 
 
How, then, does Augustine conceptualise 'nothing'?  What is 'nothing'?  What 
does Augustine mean when he speaks of the 'nothing'?  Is 'nothing' really 
anything at all?  If 'nothing' haunts, disrupts and deconstructs Augustine, does 
this imply that it is 'something' or is it, after all, nothing and is it this very 
nothingness that bothers him?  Does Augustine really mean anything when he 
speaks of 'nothing'?  Is anything conveyed or does he merely engage in idle 
chatter or, indeed, in nothing at all? 
 
*    *    *    * 
 
In order to understand Augustine's conception of the 'nihil' we must turn to his 
accounts of creation in particular, where the concept gets its most extended 
treatments.  Indeed, Augustine wrote on and developed the doctrine of creation 
                                                 
1  For detailed discussion of this, see Laurence Paul Hemming,  'Nihilism: Heidegger 
and the Grounds of Redemption' in John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham 
Ward (eds.),  Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology  (London: Routledge, 1999),  pp. 91-108. 
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at length at various points in his life.  By the time Augustine developed his 
thinking on creation, the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo had become the accepted and 
orthodox Christian account.  Furthermore, this doctrine was an explicitly 
Christian one.  For as Tarsicius van Bavel points out, the concept was 
'unthinkable for Greek philosophers [who held that] out of nothing, nothing can 
originate'.2  Theophilus of Antioch was the first Christian writer to give explicit 
arguments in favour of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, which van Bavel usefully 
summarises as follows: '1) If not only God but matter also were uncreated, as 
held by the Platonists, God would no longer be the creator of everything and the 
only Lord; 2) If matter were uncreated and unchanging, it would be equal to the 
immutable God; 3) If God had created the world out of preexisting matter, that 
would be nothing special; for human beings also can produce something new out 
of existent matter.'3  Theophilus' arguments were obviously found to be 
persuasive because all later Christian writers accepted the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo as the definitive Christian teaching on creation.  Furthermore, the doctrine 
was also thought to be of crucial importance in safeguarding what Rowan 
Williams identifies as being at the heart of Augustine's accounts of creation, 
namely, a simultaneous defence of both God's transcendence over the world and 
his inextricable connection with it.4  Again, as van Bavel puts it, the Church 
Fathers 'unanimously emphasize that God has willed the world freely.  Because 
He willed it there is proximity; because He made it out of nothing there is 
distance.'5 
 
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo was therefore one inherited by Augustine, 
although he undoubtedly gave it a more extended treatment and developed its 
detail to a much greater extent than any of his predecessors.  The occasions for 
these treatments were extended commentaries on the accounts of creation found 
in the opening books of Genesis, of which it is generally held that Augustine 
wrote five over a period of around thirty years.6  As the title of the first of these 
                                                 
2  Tarsicius van Bavel, 'The Creator and the Integrity of Creation in the Fathers of the 
Church, Especially in Saint Augustine',  Augustinian Studies  21 (1990), p. 4.  Van Bavel 
gives a succinct summary of the background to and origins of the doctrine of 'creation 
out of nothing' on pp. 4-6, to which I am indebted in this paragraph. 
3  Ibid.,  p. 4. 
4  'Continuity and discontinuity between God and creation are....very hard to pull apart 
in Augustine's thought.  The continuities, the ways in which creation shares in the sort 
of life that is God's, steer us inexorably back to the fundamental difference.'  Rowan 
Williams, '"Good for Nothing?" Augustine on Creation'  Augustinian Studies 25 (1994), 
pp. 15-16. 
5  Van Bavel,  'The Creator and the Integrity of Creation',  p. 5. 
6  These were: On Genesis against the Manichees (De Genesi contra Manichaeos), On the 
Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book (De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber), 
books eleven to thirteen of the Confessions (Confessiones), the twelve books of On Genesis 
Literally Interpreted (De Genesi ad litteram) and book eleven of The City of God (De civitate 
Dei).  These works were all written (along with numerous other works) between 388 or 
389 and around 420.  See Roland J. Teske, 'Introduction' to The Fathers of the Church: A 
New Translation, Vol. 84: St Augustine on Genesis  (Washington: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1991), pp. 3-4.  Elsewhere, Teske further identifies the opening section of 
Contra adversarium logic et prophetarum (419-21) as a sixth possible source of Augustine's 
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works, De Genesi contra Manichaeos makes clear, Augustine's writings on creation 
were to a large extent motivated by a desire to overturn the teachings of the 
Manichees, a religious group to which he had once belonged.  For one thing, the 
Manichees were fond of ridiculing what they perceived to be the 
anthropomorphic conception of God found in the Old Testament - especially in 
the creation accounts - and Augustine was determined to respond to these 
misinterpretations.  But perhaps more importantly, he was committed to 
repudiating the all-pervading dualism between the Principles of Light and 
Darkness that lay at the heart of the Manichaean worldview.  These two 
principles were primordial and preceded the existence of the visible world which 
came into being as a result of the invasion of the realm of Light by the realm of 
Darkness.  Thus, good and evil are held to be two separate and substantive 
principles or substances in the world pertaining to the realms of Light and 
Darkness respectively.7  The result of this is that there is a whole realm of being 
in the visible world that is outside of God's realm of Light, and it is this that 
Augustine finds particularly objectionable.  For the inevitable corollary of this 
Manichaean worldview was that God's sovereignty over the world was not 
absolute in the way that Christianity insisted it was, for the world contained a 
principle of Darkness that was independent of and in opposition to God's realm 
of Light.   
 
In the Confessions, Augustine considers this worldview and the fact that he had 
once shared it:  'I believed that evil....was some....kind of substance, a shapeless, 
hideous mass, which might be solid, in which case the Manichees called it earth, 
or fine and rarefied like air.  This they imagine as a kind of evil mind filtering 
through the substance they call earth.  And because such little piety as I had 
compelled me to believe that God, who is good, could not have created an evil 
nature, I imagined that there were two antagonistic masses, both of which were 
infinite, yet the evil in a lesser and the good in a greater degree.'8  In order to 
overcome this, it was necessary for Augustine to come to see that all of creation - 
without remainder or reserve - is created by, participates in and is sustained by 
God.  If this was the case, then the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo could scarcely be 
avoided and, indeed, it became the fundamental basis upon which Augustine 
undertook to repudiate Manichaean dualism.  For the doctrine that God created 
all things out of nothing meant first, that there was no pre-existent primaeval 
matter that was in any way co-eternal with God; secondly, that everything that 
exists in the visible (and invisible) world was created and sustained by God; and 
thirdly, because it is inconceivable that anything created by God could be 
                                                                                                                         
account of the Genesis creation narratives.  See Roland J. Teske, 'Genesis Accounts of 
Creation' in Allan D. Fitzgerald (ed.),  Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia  
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1999),  pp. 380-81. 
7  See N. Joseph Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo and the Theology of St Augustine: The Anti-
Manichaean Polemic and Beyond  (New York: Peter Lang, 1999),  chapter 1.  Here, Torchia 
gives a detailed account of the Manichaean cosmogony based on two main sources: the 
Liber Scholiorum (c. 790-92) of the Nestorian Bishop Theodore bar Khoni and the Fihrist 
or Catalogue of the Sciences (c. 988) of Ibn Abi Ja'kub an-Nadim.  
8  Augustine,  Confessiones, V: 10.  The Confessions, tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin  (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1961), p. 104.   
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anything other than good, it therefore follows that evil as such does not exist but 
is rather simply the privation of good.9   Thus, outside of God's sustaining power 
and sovereignty, there was literally nothing. 
 
But what exactly does Augustine mean by 'nothing' and what role does the 
concept play within his doctrine of creation?  In particular, what is the 
ontological status of the 'nihil'?  In other words, is the 'nihil', in spite of being 
nothing, still in some sense 'something'?  At certain times, Augustine's response 
to this question can appear to be ambiguous.  One source of possible confusion 
has been the question of the 'formless matter' out of which it is said that God 
created the world.  For as well as insisting that God created the world out of 
nothing, Augustine was also wont to claim that God created the world out of 
'formless matter'.  The reason for this, as Roland J. Teske has explained, is that 
Augustine was constrained to ensure that various and diverse scriptural 
assertions were interpreted in such ways as to make them consistent with each 
other.  For example, 'in Wisdom 11:18, where his version of the Bible followed 
the Septuagint, Augustine read that wisdom created the world from unformed 
matter, so that he had to interpret Genesis 1:2 as referring to such matter in a 
language more suited to ordinary people.'10  Thus, Augustine had 
simultaneously to claim both that God created out of nothing and that God 
created out of formless matter: 'First there was made confused and formless 
matter so that out of it there might be made all the things that God distinguished 
and formed.'11  He goes on to say that 'therefore, we correctly believe that God 
made all things from nothing.  For, though all formed things were made from 
this matter, this matter itself was still made from absolutely nothing....Almighty 
God did not have to be helped by anything that he had not made so that he could 
make what he wanted.  For if something that he had not made helped him to 
make those things he wanted to make, he was not almighty, and that is 
sacrilegious to believe.'12   
 
It is clear, therefore, that Augustine makes a definite distinction between 
'formless matter' on the one hand and the 'nihil' on the other.  Elsewhere, 
Augustine clarifies the ontological distinction between the two, saying that this 
formless matter was 'in an intermediate stage between form and non-existence, 
some formless thing that was next to being nothing at all.'  Furthermore, he says 
                                                 
9  As Augustine puts it, 'whatever is, is good; and evil, the origin of which I was trying 
to find, is not a substance, because if it were a substance, it would be good....So it 
became obvious to me that all that you have made is good, and that there are no 
substances whatsoever that were not made by you.'  Ibid., VII: 12, p. 148.  Drawing out 
the implications of this Augustine continues, 'For you [God] evil does not exist, and not 
only for you but for the whole of your creation as well, because there is nothing outside 
it which could invade it and break down the order which you have imposed upon it.'  
Ibid., VII: 13, p. 148. 
10  Teske,  'Genesis Accounts of Creation',  p. 380. 
11  Augustine,  De Genesi Contra Manichaeos,  I: 5: 9.  'Two Books On Genesis Against the 
Manichees' in The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Vol. 84: Augustine on Genesis  
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), p. 57. 
12  Ibid., I: 6: 10,  pp. 57-8. 
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that 'it was nothing and yet something, or that it was and yet was not.  Whatever 
it is, it must have been there first, able to be the vehicle for all the composite 
forms which we can see in the world.'13  Thus, we begin to see the emergence of a 
hierarchy of being.  If the created world is suspended between God and the 
'nihil', so the 'formless matter' out of which the visible world was created is 
suspended between that world (something) and the 'nihil' (nothing).  It is clear, 
however, that whatever has any form of existence, including the 'formless 
matter', has been brought into being by God out of nothing. 
 
Even allowing for the fact that Augustine's 'formless matter' is not to be confused 
with his conception of the 'nihil', however, other commentators have still 
suspected that Augustine's 'nihil', far from being ontologically 'nothing', is 
actually 'something', some form of substance, roughly equivalent to the Platonic 
conception of hyle.  Robert J. O'Connell, for instance, says that Augustine's 
conception of the 'nihil', particularly in his early writings, comes 'uncomfortably 
close to the Neoplatonic non-being (me on)' and the quasi-existence which 
Poltinus attached to that notion.'14  Ludwig Koenen, on the other hand, as Joseph 
Torchia points out, 'proposes that Augustine's conception of the nihil assumes the 
character of an aliquid, along with the negative qualities of Manichaean hyle.  
Koenen further observes that [the] Augustinian nihil takes on almost the quality 
of being, just as [formless] matter is designated as a "near-nothing" (paene nihil).'15  
Torchia himself, however, says that 'such interpretations must be approached 
with reservation', although he concedes that 'Augustine does exhibit some 
inconsistencies in his treatment of the nihil', which no doubt may give rise to the 
sort of interpretations propounded by O'Connell and Koenen.16  The most 
striking example of this is to be found in De Beata Vita, where Augustine 
describes the 'nihil' as 'whatever is flowing, dissolving, melting and - so to speak 
- perpetually perishing'.17  Commenting on this, Torchia says that 'while this 
                                                 
13  Augustine,  Confessiones,  XII: 6,  pp. 283-84.  It should be noted that although 
Augustine says of this formless matter that 'it must have been there first', this should 
not be understood in a strictly temporal sense.  As Augustine says elsewhere, 'But we 
must not suppose that unformed matter is prior in time to things that are formed; both 
the thing made and the matter from which it was made were created together.'  And 
again, he says, 'It is not in the order of time but in the order of causality that matter 
unformed and formable, both spiritual and corporeal, came first in creation.  It was the 
substratum of what was to be made, although it did not exist before it was created.'  De 
Genesi ad Litteram  1: 15: 29 and 5: 5: 13,  The Literal Meaning of Genesis Vol. 1, tr. John 
Hammond Taylor,  Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation No. 
41  (New York: Newman Press, 1982),  pp. 36 and 154.  See also Confessiones,  XIII: 33. 
14  Robert J. O'Connell,  St Augustine's Early Theory of Man, AD 386-391  (Cambridge, 
Mass.:  The Belknap Press, 1968), p. 187.  Quoted in Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  pp. 130-
31, n. 80. 
15  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  p. 131,  n. 80.  Torchia refers to Ludwig Koenen, 'Augustine 
and Manichaeism in Light of the Cologne Mani Codex',  Illinois Classical Studies  3 
(1978), p. 159. 
16  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  p. 113. 
17  Augustine,  De Beata Vita  2: 8.  Quoted by Roland J. Teske in a translator's note in St 
Augustine on Genesis,  p. 58, n. 38.  This passage is also quoted by Torchia in Creatio ex 
nihilo,  p. 113. 
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definition suggests a deficiency or lack of stability, it does not really designate 
absolute non-being.  Only that which has some ontological status can "flow," 
"dissolve," "melt," and "steadily perish".'18   
 
But such a characterisation is so contrary to Augustine's many other 
characterisations of the 'nihil' as absolute non-being and, therefore, as 
ontologically 'nothing', that most commentators prefer to view this passage, and 
other occasional passages like it, as slips or aberrations arising from the inherent 
difficulty of conceptualising pure nothingness.  Teske, for instance, points out 
that 'the idea of nothing was not an easy one to come by, especially for a 
Platonist who views being in terms of permanence and stability.'19  And Torchia 
similarly says that such language 'can be attributed to the impossibility of 
adequately describing what is completely non-existent.'  He says that 
Augustine's clear and repeated metaphysical distinction between being and non-
being should preclude us from laying too much interpretative weight upon such 
relatively rare indications of a 'substantial' conception of the 'nihil' on 
Augustine's part.20  Instead, we should remember that Augustine, much more 
characteristically, defines the 'nihil' as 'that which was entirely nonexistent'.21  
And, even more explicitly, in a discussion of the opening verses of John 1, he 
berates those who interpret 'nothing' as 'something': 'Now we must not heed the 
raving of individuals who think that "nothing" in this passage is to be taken as 
"something", and who think that they can compel assent to this sort of nonsense 
on the ground that nothing is put at the end of the sentence.'22  Perhaps more 
important, however, is the fact that whole sense of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
depends on the 'nihil' being conceived literally as nothing, as no form of 
substance or quasi-substance, and as having no ontological referent whatsoever. 
 
Far from simplifying matters, however, Augustine's unambiguous denial that the 
'nihil' is 'something' (in spite of occasional suggestions to the contrary on his 
part) actually complicates them.  For now we are presented with the further 
difficulty, as we have already intimated, of how we are to conceptualise 
something which, precisely because it is nothing, eludes conceptualisation.  
Difficult though it may be, Augustine certainly does attempt such 
conceptualisation.  What is particularly revealing and intriguing about this, 
however, is the manner in which this is done.  For he does not, on the one hand, 
conclude that 'nothing', precisely because it is 'nothing', is scarcely worthy of 
further elucidation, discussion or conceptualisation, given that nothing 
meaningful can be said about 'nothing'.  Neither, on the other hand, does he 
invoke the utter heteronomy and horror of 'nothing' with respect to God and 
                                                 
18  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  p. 113. 
19  Teske,  St Augustine on Genesis,  p. 58,  n. 38. 
20  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  pp. 113 and 114. 
21  Augustine,  De Genesi ad Litteram,  7: 5: 7,  The Literal Meaning of Genesis Vol. 2, tr. John 
Hammond Taylor,  Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation No. 
42  (New York: Newman Press, 1982), p. 6. 
22  Augustine,  De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos, 25.  Quoted in Torchia,  Creatio ex 
nihilo,  p. 178. 
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God's creation, a strategy ruled out, presumbaly, by his anti-Manichaean 
conviction that even 'nothingness' must somehow be brought within God's all-
embracing sovereignty.  Rather, Augustine assigns the 'nihil' a role in his 
dramatic theological schema.  The 'nihil' is brought within and 'positioned' 
within Augustine's theological metanarrative.  In other words, the 'nihil' appears 
to be domesticated theologically and, as such, re-appears in Augustine's texts time 
and again.  Although, for Augustine, God has 'overcome' the 'nihil', such 
'overcoming' never seems to be entirely accomplished and the 'nihil' continually 
re-appears as God's domesticated 'other'.  Furthermore, the 'nihil' is (negatively) 
evaluated, it is (theoretically) capable of re-asserting itself and it is constantly 
threatening to pull human beings back down into nothingness.  The 'nihil' in 
other words has not been banished or eradicated (nothingness has not been 
unproblematically overcome), but neither can its absolute heteronomy be 
contemplated, and so the 'nihil' appears in Augustine's texts as an absence that is 
nonetheless controlled, positioned and domesticated by God. 
  
I now want to consider some examples of this.  We have already observed that, 
for Augustine, God is the supreme fullness of Being, the corollary of which is 
that 'being' itself is good.  This means that everything that exists is good precisely 
because everything that exists was created by and participates in God.  Thus, 
Augustine claims that 'all the things which God made are very good; natural 
things are not evil.'23  And again, he says that 'Existence as such is good, and 
supreme existence is the chief good.'24  If this is the case, however, then it is 
perhaps to be expected that nothingness or non-being would be equated with 
corruption, evil and death, which indeed turns out to be the case.  Furthermore, 
this is what enables Augustine to explain why creatures have a tendency toward 
corruption and evil, even though they have been created by a good God.  For the 
Manichees, of course, this question was much less problematic.  The origin of evil 
in the world is to be found in the self-sustaining realm of Darkness, and therefore 
God's goodness remains untouched and uncontaminated by the presence of evil, 
for which he is in no way responsible.  By denying the existence of evil as a 
positive reality, Augustine had rescued the supremacy and sovereignty of God 
from its encroachment by an oppositional and co-equal force or substance.  At 
the same time, however, Augustine had to confront the problem of how the 
world, which was good by the very fact of its existence, could admit the presence 
of evil or, rather, the absence of good.   
 
It was in answer to this challenge that Augustine found himself, once again, 
invoking the concept of the 'nihil'.  He said that it was because creatures were 
created out of nothing that they have a natural tendency toward corruption and 
evil.  Their creation by God may explain the fact that they are good, but the fact 
that they were created out of nothing likewise explains why they have 
corruptible natures.  The corollary is obvious: goodness comes from God, while 
                                                 
23  Augustine,  De Genesi ad Litteram Imperfectus Liber,  1: 3,  'On the Literal Interpretation 
of Genesis: An Unfinished Book'  in  St Augustine on Genesis,  p. 146. 
24  Augustine,  De Vera Religionae,  XVII: 34 - XVIII: 36, quoted in Torchia,  Creatio ex 
nihilo,  p. 116. 
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evil and corruption come from the 'nihil'.  As Torchia puts it, 'In Augustine's 
articulation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo we find a sharp distinction between 
being and non-being: being is correlative with goodness, and non-being is 
inextricably bound up with the corruption or privation of existent natures.  Such 
ontological deficiency constitutes an evil, but an evil which does not exist in its 
own right'25  Thus, the 'nihil', far from being literally nothing, about which 
nothing meaningful may be said, actually plays a crucial and indispensable role 
in Augustine's account of the world, its being, its creation and its relationship to 
God.  It is that which accounts for the world's corruptibility and tendency toward 
nothingness and it continues to make its haunting 'presence' or 'absence' felt in 
the undoubted 'presence' of evil in the world, a 'presence' which is itself an 
'absence'.   
 
There are two important conclusions to draw from this, therefore: first, far from 
being nothing, about which - precisely because it is nothing - we can do no other 
but remain silent, the 'nihil' is unambiguously evaluated as an evil.  Indeed, not 
only is it itself evaluated as evil, but it is the cause and explanation of all evil in 
the world.  Secondly, God's creation of the world does not banish, overcome or 
destroy the 'nihil'; rather, as we shall consider in more detail, the 'nihil' is always 
hovering in the background, waiting to re-assert itself should God cease his 
continuous act of conservation.  Furthermore, the 'nihil' actually does re-assert 
itself wherever evil is to be found within the world.  Consequently, we begin to 
suspect that the 'nihil' is being expected to play too large a role in Augustine's 
drama of creation for it to be pure nothingness.  On the other hand, we also begin 
to suspect that the 'nihil' is playing too small a role in Augustine's texts for it to 
be the threatening heteronomous 'other' of God.  The pure nothingness of the 
nihil (whether banished or threatening) has been domesticated into playing an 
indispensible role in a creation drama directed by God. 
 
This suspicion has, in fact, been explicitly voiced by Brian Rotman, whose 
comments here are highly pertinent.  In order to understand Augustine's 
distinctive disposition toward the 'nihil', he contextualises the emerging thought 
of the early Christian church by taking us back to its hellenic heritage: '....the 
Greek reaction to the void, characterised by unease, fear, and horror, was one of 
psycholoigcal denial.  Within the full indivisible universe of Being there could be 
no fissure, absence, hole or vacuum; the void did not exist, it could have no 
being, it was not.'26  Had Augustine followed Greek thought in this respect, he 
would have been constrained to claim that the world was uncontaminated by 
absence, that the 'nihil' had been unambiguously banished, that the 'nihil' was, 
quite simply, without qualification or reserve, nothing.  And yet we have seen 
that Augustine does not follow this route.  Instead, the 'nihil' plays an 
indispensible role in his understanding of the world, its creatures and God's 
relationship to both.  Rotman suggests that this was because the Greek negation 
                                                 
25  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  p. 117. 
26  Brian Rotman,  Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero  (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 
1987), p. 63.  I am most grateful to my colleague Dr Paul Fletcher for referring me to this 
text. 
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of nothingness was inconsistent with the Christian account of creation ex nihilo 
which implied that the 'nihil' had some sort of positive role to play, thus forcing 
the early Christian theologians to conceive of 'nothing' as something.  One would 
wish to qualify Rotman's account at this point by saying that although he is right 
to point out that Augustine's theological conception of the 'nihil' is, in fact, an 
avoidance of pure nothingness, we have nevertheless seen that Augustine has 
unambiguously denied that the 'nihil' is 'something'.  It thus seems that the 
concept bears witness to a haunting presence/absence that is between 'something' 
and 'nothing'.27 
 
Rotman explains further: 'St Augustine, though he absorbed the God of 
Parmenides and Plato and their abhorrence of the void through the neo-Platonist 
writings of Plotinus and not from Aristotle, assigned an eschatoloigcal status to 
'nothing' - it was the devil - which neatly Christianises the sort of horrific object 
Aristotle was at such pains to deny.'28  On Rotman's reading, therefore, 
Augustine's philosophical predisposition was to deny the void in favour of the 
fullness of being, but finding himself theologically constrained to work within 
the Christian account of creation ex nihilo, he did the next best thing which was to 
domesticate or Christianise the 'nihil'.  Hence, the substantive role we have seen 
Augustine to have ascribed to the nihil - as that out of which the world was 
created, that which continually threatens to pull creatures back into nothingness, 
that which is the source of all evil and so forth.  But this, of course, raises the 
further question of whether the 'nihil', thus conceived, is really 'nothing', or 
whether, on the other hand, it constitutes a denial of nothingness.  Again, 
Rotman suggests the latter.  He says that 'this attempt to negate the problem of 
"nothing", by a formulaic transfer of Aristotle'[s] horror of the void onto God's 
transformative overcoming of it, was more of an avoidance of the void than any 
real engagement with a sign signfying no thing.'29  So Augustine's Christianised 
and domesticated concept of the nihil constistutes a denial of the nihil rather 
than an engagement with it.  Or, alternatively, we may say that Augustine's 
conception of the nihil constitutes a repression of the nihil.   
 
                                                 
27  It is necessary to sound a note of caution here for the language we are using is 
remarkably close to the language we have seen Augustine himself to invoke in order to 
clarify the ontological status of the 'formless matter' out of which God created the 
world.  But although the language is the remarkably similar, the meaning is strikingly 
different.  For the 'formless matter' spoken of in the creation accounts is neither 
something nor nothing in the sense that it stands at a mid-point between the two.  The 
'formless matter' stands on a spectrum or continuum between nothing and something.  
On the other hand, when speaking of the role the concept of the 'nihil' plays within 
Augustine's writings as falling between nothing and something, I am rather suggesting 
that it is neither unequivocally nothing nor unequivocally something.  The 'nihil', it 
seems, is between nothing and something in the sense that it escapes that very 
opposition rather than falling at a mid-point between the two (even though, of course, 
Augustine himself wants to claim that the 'nihil' is unequivocally nothing).  
 
28  Rotman,  Signifying Nothing, p. 63. 
29  Ibid., p. 64. 
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In the wake of psychoanalytic thought, however, we have learned that the 
mechanism of repression is never total.  The very means by which the repression 
is enacted also bears witness to that which is being repressed.  The 'manifest' text 
itself harbours the key through which the 'latent' text - that which has been 
repressed - may be accessed.  Thus, we may well suspect that Augutsine's texts 
themselves manifest the traces of that which they are repressing, the traces of the 
'nihil' as the absolute other - absolute absence as opposed to God's absolute 
presence.  Indeed, if we allow Augustine's repressive censor to be relaxed, we see 
that his own texts bear within themselves, and thus lend themselves to, an 
alternative, more theologically transgressive reading of the world as the effect of 
an interplay between presence and absence - between the absolute presence of 
God and the absolute absence of the 'nihil'. Indeed, we have already observed 
that within Augustine's texts, the 'nihil' is always hovering in the background as 
a haunting presence that is never quite present or, alternatively, as a haunting 
absence that is never quite absent.  In spite of Augustine's claims that God's 
activity of creation and conservation establishes presence and abolishes absence, 
things are not quite so straightforward.  The presence that God's creation 
establishes seems to be always haunted by the absence out of which it was 
brought.  I now want to expose these traces more explicitly by turning to two 
forms of thought which Augustine did not himself hold but to which he 
sometimes hovered close. 
       
The first of these is occasionalism.  Occasionalism, as Richard Sorabji has well 
characterised it, 'turns all causation into forms of creation, and gives a sense, not 
merely, like Berkeley's theory, of the dependence of the world on God, but of its 
precariousness.  The theory can be illustrated by saying that the dye does not 
cause the cloth to become black.  Rather, its presence merely provides God with 
the occasion for making the cloth black, so that, at least on the strictest version of 
the theory, all causal power is reserved for God.'30  As Sorabji points out, 
Augustine is not a proponent of occasionalism, even though Malebranche 
acknowledges him 'as a source of inspiration for his own occasionalism'.  Instead, 
Augustine adopts an alternative strategy for safeguarding God's causal and 
creative power, namely, 'by making everything depend for its continuation on 
God.'31  This, of course, is the doctrine of divine conservation, whereby if God 
were to cease his continuous and ongoing conservative activity, which is what 
holds creatures and creation out of nothing, they would immediately collapse 
back into the nothingness out of which they were brought.  The doctrine of 
conservation is intimately bound up with Augustine's doctrine of creation, as is 
evident when he says that 'the power and might of the Creator, who rules and 
embraces all, makes every creature abide; and if this power ever ceased to 
govern creatures, their essences would pass away and all nature would perish.'32  
Thus, creatures, precisely because they are created out of nothing, have a natural 
                                                 
30  Richard Sorabji,  Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early 
Middle Ages  (London: Duckworth, 1983),  p. 297. 
31  Ibid.,  pp. 302 and 303. 
32  St Augustine,  De Genesi ad Litteram,  4: 12: 22,  p. 117.  Sorabji quotes from this 
passage in Time, Creation and the Continuum, pp. 303-4. 
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tendency toward non-being; they have nothing inherent to themselves which 
allows them to continue in being.  The fact that they do continue to exist is due 
solely to the fact that God is continuously conserving and sustaining them.  As 
Torchia puts it, 'in Augustinian terms, whatever is created from nothing is 
contingent, mutable and oriented toward non-being'.33   
 
Thus, we can see why, as Sorabji has asserted, Augustine's doctrine of 
conservation is one alternative way to occasionalism of conserving the world's 
dependence upon God.  But we can also see why it also gives a sense of the 
world's precariousness.  For Augustine's image is of a world precariously 
balanced between God (being) and the 'nihil' (non-being), precisely because the 
world is created by God (being) out of the 'nihil' (non-being).  In so far as 
creatures are created out of nothing, they have a natural tendency toward non-
being, but in so far as they continue in being, they do so only because of God's 
ongoing conservative activity which prevents them from falling back into 
nothingness.  This returns us to the point with which I began this discussion, 
namely, that far from being conquered, eradicated or banished, the 'nihil' is 
overcome only in so far as God continues with his ongoing conservative activity.  
God is unable to leave creatures to their own devices, because if he were to do so, 
the 'nihil' would immediately and spontaneously re-assert itself.  As Augustine 
says, 'When a builder puts up a house and departs, his work remains in spite of 
the fact that he is no longer there.  But the universe will pass away in the 
twinkling of an eye if God withdraws His ruling hand.'34  It seems, then, that 
God's activity of conservation is merely reactive.  The 'nihil' is the 'natural' state 
of affairs, it will ordinarily prevail unless God intervenes to ensure otherwise.  
This leads one to question whether God or the 'nihil' has conceptual priority 
here.  Are we beginning to see glimpses here of a 'nihil' that is not contained and 
domesticated by God but a 'nihil' that is radically other than God, a 'nihil' that is 
in some sense God's rival? 
 
This point is made even more explicitly when we turn to the second teaching (or 
heresy) to which Augustine comes close, namely, that of annihilationism, as Nick 
Land has made clear.  Annihilationism arose out of an apparent contradiction or 
at least tension between the necessity of God's conservation for the continued 
existence of all things on the one hand and the eternal damnation of those souls 
that are not saved on the other.  For souls to be eternally damned, it is clear that 
they must eternally exist.  Now, if this is the case, it must be the result of one of 
two possibilities: either all souls must be naturally immortal or else God must be 
continually maintaining these souls in existence purely for the sake of their 
eternal and never-ending torture and punishment.  The former possibility is 
clearly ruled out by the doctrine of divine conservation which we have been 
considering.  It is inconceivable that any created thing (i.e. anything at all other 
than God) could be naturally eternal, and therefore if souls are to be damned 
eternally, this must be because God preserves them in being for the sake of their 
eternal damnation.  The only other possibility here would be to deny that God 
                                                 
33  Torchia,  Creatio ex nihilo,  p. 152. 
34  Augustine,  De Genesi ad Litteram,  4: 12: 22,  p. 117. 
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does in fact sustain them in being, with the result that such souls would simply 
fall into non-being, that is to say, they would simply cease to exist.  As Nick Land 
says, 'this is the extreme heresy of annihilationism, later to be associated with the 
Socinians (who were rigorously persecuted for it) and the Arians.'35   
 
Land concentrates his discussion upon Aquinas, whom he thinks 'demonstrates 
intellectual and literary powers far outstripping those of Augustine'36, although it 
should be said that Aquinas's writings on these matters are entirely consistent 
with Augustine's teachings on creation and conservation which we have been 
considering.  To return to the contradiction or tension that gave rise to the 
annihilationist heresy, Land says that Aquinas, confronted with this quagmire, 
'insists upon the (limited) plausibility of the annihilationist case.  He divides his 
argument into stages, first affirming God's power to annihilate, and only then 
denying that this power is in fact exercised by a benevolent being'.37  Thus, in the 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas says 'just as before things existed God had the power 
of not giving them existence, and thus of not creating, so also once they are 
created he has the power of not continuing to uphold them in existence; they 
would then cease to be.  That is annihilation [Quod est eas in nihilum redigere].'38  
Thus, Aquinas affirms the logical possibility of annihilation and affirms that God 
does indeed have the power so to annihilate.  This, as we have seen, is entirely 
consistent with Augustine's teaching that God's continuous creative act of 
conservation is what holds creatures in existence, without which they would fall 
back into the nothingness out of which they were made.   
 
Once again, however, it seems that all of creation is suspended between God and 
the 'nihil': created by God and therefore sustained in being, but created out of 
nothing, and therefore inherently oriented toward nothingness.  The created 
world itself, therefore, is between the presence of God and the absence of the nihil.  
God creates a world that is not unproblematically present (as God himself is) but 
which is constituted by an interplay between presence and absence, between 
God and the 'nihil'.  The creation of the world, therefore, far from banishing the 
'nihil', actually depends on its haunting presence/absence.  The 'nihil', in other 
words, is a condition of the world's possibility as the world.  For only God is 
uncontaminated by the 'nihil'.  Thus, Land says that the heresy of 
annihilationism 'clarifies the fundamental impetus of Judaeo-Christian 
monotheism as no other doctrine can.  This God is the antagonist of zero, and 
therefore the fortress of identity, personality, individuation.  To be exiled 
definitively from such a God - to lose his protection - is to relapse into indivisible 
non-being; de-created into the nihil.'39 
                                                 
35  Nick Land,  The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism  (London: 
Routledge, 1992),  p. 100. 
36  Ibid.,  p. 99. 
37  Ibid.,  p. 101.  This, of course, gives rise to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that 
it is God's benevolence that ensures the damnation of unredeemed souls for eternity.  
As Land puts it, 'eternal damnation as the sentimentality of God'. 
38  Thomas Aquinas,  Summa Theologiae, Vol. 14, tr. Thomas Gilbey  (London: Blackfriars, 
1964),  p. 49.  Quoted in Land,  Thirst for Annihilation,  p. 101.   
39  Land,  Thirst for Annihilation,  p. 102. 
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What we see emerging here, therefore, is a theological schema in which God and 
the 'nihil' are opposites, a more radical schema than the one where the 'nihil' is 
domesticated by God.  Now God and the 'nihil' appear to be heteronomous 
opposites, between which there is an undecidable priority.  The world, in many 
ways, appears to be an effect of this very undecidability.  God is the 'fortress of 
identity', the 'antagonist of zero', which is to say, the antagonist of the 'nihil'.  
Though created by God, the world seems to be forever haunted by the spectre of 
the 'nothing' that is never completely banished.  Because they are created out of 
nothing, the world and creatures always tend toward nothingness into which 
they would fall if God were to cease sustaining them.  Their corruptible and 
sinful nature likewise springs from their nihilistic origin, an origin that forever 
haunts them and indeed constitutes them as finite corruptible beings.  The world, 
it seems, is not simply the work of God, does not unproblematically embody his 
presence but is, on the contrary, as much a creation of the 'nihil' as it is of God.  
The world, as we have noted, appears to be 'suspended' between God on the one 
hand and the 'nihil' on the other. This is why Land graphically speaks of God 
and the nihil squabbling over creation 'as jealous rivals fight over a shared 
lover'.40  If this is the case, the world bears witness not simply to the presence of 
God but also to the absence of the 'nihil' precisely because it is itself constituted 
by both the presence of God and the absence of the 'nihil'.  The co-mingling, the 
interplay and interaction of God and the nihil, of presence and absence is what 
makes the world what it is, is a condition, in effect, of its very possibility.  In 
other words, the created world does not embody God's triumph over the 'nihil' 
but rather God's connivance with it.  In this connivance, God's ontological 
priority is compromised as God colludes with his 'other' and thereby brings the 
world into being.   
 
As a result, however, and as if often the case with such opposites, God and the 
'nihil' appear to be more mutually implicated and more proximate than one 
would initially believe.  For this co-constitution of the created world means that, 
on the one hand, God is never entirely present and, on the other hand, that the 
'nihil' is never entirely absent.  Thus, the possibility of God's total presence 
becomes an impossibility and as God's presence becomes impossible, God begins 
to withdraw without ever completely disappearing.  Consequently,  it is not 
entirely clear how God's presence is to be distinguished from God's absence.  
Conversely, within the created world, the possibility of the nihil's total absence 
becomes an impossibility.  This is because if the nihil were completely absent, 
God's presence would be fully established and this would be, in effect, the end of 
the created world.  As the overcoming of the nihil is never finally effected, the 
nihil begins to emerge, to make its (quasi-)presence felt, without ever completely 
appearing.  On this reading, therefore, the world becomes an effect of the 
interplay between presence and absence, in which the possibility of pure 
presence as well as the possibility of pure absence become impossibilities.  From 
the point of view of the world, God becomes impossible without the 'nihil' and 
the 'nihil' becomes impossible without God.  Just as both are the conditions for 
                                                 
40  Ibid.,  p. 101-102. 
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the possibility of the world, so from the point of view of that world, each is 
impossible without the other.  Furthermore, when the impossibility of God's 
presence means that he withdraws and (almost) becomes absent and when the 
impossibility of the nihil's absence means that it emerges and (almost) becomes 
present, it becomes clear that far from being opposites, God and the nihil become 
proximate, they almost become one.   
 
Transposed into conceptual or theoretical terms (as if we have not already been 
conceptual or theoretical enough), this has important implications for the 
question of the very possibility of both theology and nihilism.  If the world is 
constituted by an interplay between presence and absence, God and the 'nihil', 
then neither theology nor nihilism alone will be adequate means of 
understanding that world.  If God's total presence is as much an impossibility as 
nihilism's total absence, then both theology alone and nihilism alone likewise 
become impossibilities.  Just as the world is 'suspended' between God and the 
'nihil', so our theoretical challenge is to articulate a mode of thought that is 
neither theological nor nihilistic, that is itself suspended between theology and 
nihilism.  Indeed, this very reading of Augustine's writings on the 'nihil' may be 
regarded as one preliminary and modest contribution to this ongoing theoretical 
task.  By reading Augustine's texts 'against the grain to discern the points at 
which thought is constructed by excluding or repressing alterity'41, we have 
found that Augustine has an important contribution to make to the development 
of such a theoretical task.  A transgressive reading of Augustine may well have 
much to teach us about our contemporary cultural episteme and its possibilities 
(and impossibilities) for envisioning both God and the 'nihil'.42 
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41  Mark C. Taylor, 'Postmodern Times' in Orrin F. Summerell (ed.), The Otherness of God   
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